Statement: The Restart of the Kashiwazaki-Kariwa Nuclear Plant is Unacceptable
On January 21st, TEPCO’s Kashiwazaki-Kariwa Nuclear Power Plant was restarted. We, FoE Japan, Citizen’s Eyes on Nuclear Regulation, and Niigata Citizens’ Group Monitoring the Nuclear Regulation Authority and the Nuclear Regulation Commission, strongly protest this action and issued a statement.
Statement: The Restart of the Kashiwazaki-Kariwa Nuclear Plant is Unacceptable
The Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Disaster Continues Today
Nearly 15 years have passed since the Great East Japan Earthquake of March 11, 2011 and the subsequent Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Plant accident, yet the disaster and its impacts continue in many forms. Widespread radioactive contamination occurred, and tens of thousands of people are still unable to return to their hometowns. Livelihoods that once coexisted with nature have been destroyed. The decommissioning process remains uncertain, with no clear end in sight. The Kashiwazaki-Kariwa Nuclear Power Plant is operated by TEPCO, the company responsible for the Fukushima Daiichi accident. Restarting another nuclear power plant without taking responsibility for the Fukushima nuclear disaster, and without even having a clear prospect for its resolution, is unacceptable.
Concealment, Falsification, and a Series of Scandals
TEPCO has been involved in numerous cases of concealment and misconduct. These include the deliberate cover-up and falsification of records over many years regarding cracks and equipment failures at a total of 13 reactors, including Kashiwazaki-Kariwa and Fukushima Daiichi and Daini, which came to light in 2002. During the Fukushima Daiichi disaster, TEPCO also failed to disclose the core meltdown despite having recognized it at an early stage. These incidents have cast serious doubt on the company’s competence, governance, transparency, and safety culture. At the Kashiwazaki-Kariwa plant, repeated scandals have come to light, such as improper use of operators’ ID cards and lax nuclear security management, leading at one point to what amounted to an effective operational ban imposed by the Nuclear Regulation Authority.
Recurring Control Rod Issues
On January 17, it was revealed that another control rod malfunction had occurred at Unit 6 of the Kashiwazaki-Kariwa Nuclear Power Plant. Since June 2025, there have been three incidents involving control rods at Unit 6. TEPCO’s approach of rushing to restart operations without thoroughly investigating the root causes of these failures involving such a critical safety component demonstrates a disregard for safety.
Seismic Risks
The Kashiwazaki-Kariwa Nuclear Power Plant is located in the middle of a seismic belt stretching from the Sea of Japan coast of the Tohoku region to Shinshu and Hokuriku. During the 2007 Chuetsu Offshore Earthquake (M6.8), the plant was hit by ground motions that exceeded its design-basis ground motion—the maximum seismic intensity the plant was originally designed to withstand. Although TEPCO later revised its assumptions, it has not fully evaluated the entire 50–60 km-long active submarine fault (the eastern margin fault of the Sado Basin), making the assessment insufficient.
Relying on Operators to Conduct Reviews Cannot Ensure Safety
On January 5, it was revealed that Chubu Electric Power had improperly manipulated data used as the basis for seismic design at the Hamaoka Nuclear Power Plant. Until the falsification was exposed by an external whistleblower, the Nuclear Regulation Authority and Secretariat had deemed Chubu Electric’s seismic evaluation to be “generally appropriate.” This demonstrates that regulators rely heavily on data provided by operators without adequately verifying it. Regarding the repeated control rod issues at Kashiwazaki-Kariwa Unit 6, the regulators have done little more than accept TEPCO’s announcements and have shown no serious effort to pursue the root causes. Under such a regulatory framework, nuclear safety cannot be guaranteed.
Residents Left Behind
In the event of a serious nuclear accident, residents within the PAZ (Precautionary Action Zone, within a 5 km radius of the plant) are to evacuate immediately, while those in the UPZ (Urgent Protective Action Planning Zone, within a 5–30 km radius) are to shelter indoors to avoid severe radiation exposure. UPZ residents are not ordered to evacuate until radiation levels become significantly high. In the case of a compound disaster involving natural hazards such as earthquakes and a nuclear accident, it may become impossible to either evacuate or shelter indoors. Heavy snowfall could also prevent movement for days.
The reason for requiring immediate evacuation within a 5 km radius during a serious nuclear accident is that sheltering indoors is insufficient to prevent radiation exposure. The current plans are predicated on the continued operation of nuclear power plants rather than to genuinely protect residents from radiation exposure.
Nuclear Waste with No Destination
Operating nuclear power plants continuously generates spent nuclear fuel. At the Kashiwazaki-Kariwa plant, spent fuel has been stored in on-site pools, which were nearing capacity. As a result, in September 2024, part of the spent fuel was transported to the “interim storage facility” built in Mutsu City, Aomori Prefecture. The government’s explanations about where the fuel would ultimately go have repeatedly changed. The latest explanation states that it will be sent to the Rokkasho Reprocessing Plant. However, completion of the Rokkasho plant has been delayed 27 times, and concerns about aging facilities have arisen even before it begins operation. Even if the Rokkasho plant does operate, there is still no destination decided for the vitrified high-level radioactive waste produced there.
The selection of final disposal sites for nuclear waste causes serious social impacts, including local conflict and division. The current approach of forcing nuclear power plants and nuclear waste onto depopulated areas by providing subsidies is unacceptable.
People in Niigata Are Not Convinced
In a prefectural public opinion survey conducted by Niigata Prefecture starting in September 2025, a total of 60% of respondents across all 30 municipalities answered negatively—either “I do not think so” or “I somewhat do not think so”—to the question of whether the conditions for restarting operations are currently in place.
In March 2025, 143,196 signatures calling for a prefectural referendum to decide whether to restart the Kashiwazaki-Kariwa Nuclear Power Plant were submitted to the prefectural assembly. This far exceeded the approximately 36,000 signatures required for a direct request to enact a referendum ordinance, demonstrating the will of prefectural residents to make this decision themselves.
No Need for Nuclear Power
Since the Fukushima Daiichi accident in 2011, there had been a period with no operating nuclear power plants within TEPCO’s service area. During this time, demand was met through expanded thermal power generation, growth in renewable energy (such as solar and wind), demand-side management, and interregional power sharing via transmission networks. Reduced electricity demand due to the spread of energy-efficient appliances has also made a significant contribution. As a result, the required reserve margin (3%) has generally been secured. In many cases, supply-demand tightness arises not from insufficient generation capacity but from the inability to respond quickly enough to sudden and temporary spikes in demand. What is needed now is a strengthened system for flexible and efficient supply-demand adjustment, not large-scale, centralized nuclear power plants that are difficult to adjust.
For the reasons stated above, we once again oppose the restart of the Kashiwazaki-Kariwa Nuclear Power Plant. TEPCO should focus not on operating the Kashiwazaki-Kariwa plant, but on addressing the consequences the Fukushima Daiichi accident and fulfilling its obligation to provide full compensation for the victims.
(This is the statement by FoE Japan, Citizen’s Eyes on Nuclear Regulation, and Niigata Citizens’ Group Monitoring the Nuclear Regulation Authority and the Nuclear Regulation Commission, originally published in Japanese on the 21st of January)
